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Using a World Bank large-scale, firm-level dataset for 47,346 firms in 69 emerging 
economies for the period of 2002-2006, I empirically investigate the impact of the 
efficiency of a country's legal system on firms' provision of trade credit. I find a 
positive and significant effect. The result is robust to a set of conventional controls 
used in the literature and to alternative measures of trade credit and legal system, 
including a Property Rights Index from The Heritage Foundation. To solve for the 
potential endogeneity of legal system I utilise the two-step Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) method and stepwisely include seven control variables. The 
instrument used for the full sample is legal origin; whereas for the sub-sample of 33 
ex-colonies, I alternatively use three instruments: the settler mortality rates of 
Europeans in colonies during 1600s to 1800s, the population density of the colonies 
in 1500 and urbanisation in 1500. Meanwhile, I find that legal system has a larger 
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  1. INTRODUCTION 
  
Trade credit or account receivables have been shown to be an important source of 
financing in both developing and developed economies. In an empirical study on the 
G-7 countries, Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that trade credit makes up 17.8% of 
total assets for all American firms in 1991, whereas for Japan, Germany, France, Italy 
and United Kingdom figures range from 22.1% to 29%.  For emerging countries, 
studies have also suggested likewise. For example, McMillan and Woodruff (1999) 
reported an average of 30% of the bills not paid after the suppliers had delivered the 
goods in Vietnam; while Cull, Xu and Zhu (2009) found that trade credit ranged from 
21.5% to 27.2% of total sales in China for the period of 1998-2003. Focusing on 
manufacturing firms in six African countries, Bigsten et al. (2003) report that trade 
credit was received by 62% of the sampled firms between 1992 to 1996 and is the key 
source for financing working capital. Other studies on African firms, similarly, 
underscore the importance of trade credit. In the 1994 RPED1 report of Fafchamps et 
al. on the Kenyan manufacturing industry and the 1995 report on Zimbabwean firms, 
both reveal that trade credit plays a crucial role in financing. A newer study by Shvets 
(2012), on 11,000 Russian firms between 1996 and 2002, shows that most of the 
firms have trade credit financing compared to only 40% for bank loans, and the 
average magnitude for the former exceeds the latter.  
   More recently, the role of trade credit in financial crises is also examined. While 
there have been only a few studies on this topic up to date, nevertheless preliminary 
evidence points to a substitution effect between trade credit and bank credit. For 
example, Bastos and Pindado (2012) used a dataset of 147 firms from Argentina, 
Brazil and Turkey in 1999 to 2003; and found that trade credit increases for a short 
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 period following a financial crisis. Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende (2007) in their 
study on 890 firms in six emerging economies; and Preve (2004) in his study on 530 
firms in six countries, too, documented a similar trend.  Thus, trade credit has a short-
term offsetting effect on credit tightening by formal financial institutions. 
   The prevalence and importance of trade credit spurred many theories to explain 
why firms want to grant it. One of the earliest papers to attempt this is Schwartz's 
(1974) study, which posits a financing motive. Credit providers with easy access to 
formal sources of financing have an incentive to provide credit when credit receivers 
increase their purchase of factors of production in response. Similarly, Emery (1984) 
argues that financial market imperfections prompt firms to lend out liquid reserves in 
the form of trade credit so as to earn a higher than market lending rate of returns. 
   Concerning transition countries, Delannay and Weill (2004) analysed a dataset 
consisting of 9300 companies from nine Central and Eastern European Countries in 
1999 and 2000, and conducted regressions by country to investigate the importance 
of commercial motive and financial motive for trade credit. They found financial 
motive to be a key factor, that is "suppliers act as financial intermediaries in favour of 
firms with a limited access to bank credit" (page 191). 
   Besides financial motives, a number of other determinants have also been identified 
including transaction uncertainty [e.g. Ferris (1981)], market power and price 
discrimination [e.g. Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979); Brennan, Maksimoviz and 
Zechner (1988); Ng, Smith and Smith (1999)], scale economy and seniority [e.g. 
Petersen and Rajan (1997)], ownership structure [e.g. Cull, Xu and Zhu (2009)], 
market structure [e.g. Fisman and Raturi (2004), Hyndman and Serio (2010)], 
relations between the trading partners [e.g. Biais and Gollier (1997), McMillan and 
Woodruff (1999), Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), Cuñat (2007)], externalities and 
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 trade-offs between suppliers and downstream firms in the transfer of inventory [e.g. 
Bougheas, Mateut and Mizen (2009); Daripa and Nilsen (2011)] and specialised 
goods by suppliers [e.g. Giannetti, Burkart and Ellingsen (2011); Mateut, Mizen and 
Ziane (2012)], among others. 
   Other works emphasise the effect of legal systems or the development level of 
financial markets. Fisman and Love (2003) reported that "industries that are more 
dependent on trade credit financing grow relatively more rapidly in countries with 
less developed financial intermediaries" (page 373). Whereas Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2001) in their unpublished empirical study ran both a multivariate 
regression and a two-stage regression - that instrument for the size of the banking 
system - on large publicly-traded manufacturing firms in 40 developing and 
developed countries for the period 1989-1996, and found that firms in countries with 
efficient legal systems and/or with a common law origin offer less trade credit. 
Conversely, trade credit usage increases with the size of the banking system, and this 
result is more pronounced when the banks have a low proportion of state ownership.  
   In a similar vein, studies that have examined the relation between legal systems and 
trade credit found mixed results. In a 1999 study, McMillan and Woodruff surveyed 
259 privatised, manufacturing firms in Vietnam in 1995-1997, and found that 91% of 
the firms said courts could not enforce a contract2. Instead, they show that a lack of 
alternative suppliers is a strong, positive determinant of trade credit lending. More 
lately, Shvets (2012) employs a fixed-effects ordinary least squares regression (OLS) 
on Russian firms, with the appeal rate of a court as an inverse indicator for its quality, 
but cannot find a statistically significant effect of court quality on trade credit. 
                                                 
2 Nevertheless, the authors did not prove if the efficiency of courts could promote or discourage trade 
credit. Presumably, because the legal system in Vietnam was so undeveloped, that virtually no firms 
used them in business disputes. 
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    In contrast, Hendley, Murrell and Ryterman (2000) conducted a survey on 328 
Russian firms between May and August 1997 to investigate the methods used by 
firms in enforcing business agreements with their trading partners, and they 
concluded that actual or threatened use of courts is the most widely-used method after 
direct negotiations fail.  
   In addition, Kaniki (2006) examines the relationship between trade credit and legal 
system in East Africa. Using data for 282 Kenyan, 300 Ugandan and 276 Tanzanian 
manufacturing firms between 2002 and 2003, the author investigates three hypotheses, 
including if "courts are important for resolving disputes over trade credit payments" 
(page 6) and if "trade credit supply increases with the efficiency of the court system" 
(page 8). Kaniki ran regressions to determine these hypotheses, notwithstanding the 
possibilities of reverse causality, he concluded that efficient courts are an effective 
deterrents to overdue trade credit payments because they make for credible threats. 
Furthermore, trade credit supply increases when enforcement costs are low and courts 
are efficient. 
   Arriving at similar conclusions on the importance of courts is Johnson, McMillan 
and Woodruff in their 2002a paper. Surveys were conducted in 1997, on 300 
privately-owned manufacturing firms in each of five post-communist countries: 
Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.  The authors, then, used the data for 
1460 firms, and performed  Probit and Tobit regressions to determine the effect of 
three sets of variables (i.e. bilateral relational contracting; trade association, business 
networks and social networks; and courts) on trade credit. They found that belief in 
the effectiveness of courts have a strong positive association with the provision of 
trade credit, especially for new relationships, and when there is low search cost in 
finding alternative suppliers (i.e. lock-in is low). It also encourages the establishment 
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 of new business partnership, which otherwise would not have taken place, 
particularly for specialised goods. Whereas relational contracting, like relationship 
duration and the use of networks, supports trade credit considerably in existing 
relationships and when lock-in is high. 
   Apart from the aforementioned papers, to the best of my knowledge, no other 
papers have studied the relationship between property rights and trade credit. Thus, I 
attempt to augment the literature by using an instrumental variable (IV) approach, 
which none of the previous studies have done. 
    The provision of trade credit involves an implicit contract between the credit 
provider and the credit receiver, in which the former agrees to allow the latter to 
acquire the goods first and pay later. Thus, according to Johnson, McMillan and 
Woodruff  (2002a), there are two roles for legal system in trade credit supply. First, 
legal system helps to ensure the credit receiver pays for the goods eventually. A more 
complex role is "to ensure the goods delivered are of adequate quality and in allowing 
specific investment to be undertaken" (page 224). More specifically, it has been 
argued that legal system could promote trade credit through the a) contents of the law 
which define the legal rights of creditors, and b) effectiveness in which these rights 
are enforced through the courts3.  
   The next point of interest is why actual or perceived effectiveness of legal system 
increases trade credit. In the study by Kaniki (2006), he found that better quality of 
courts and lower cost of enforcement could prevent opportunistic behaviour by the 
receiver. This, I believe, could increase the confidence of the credit provider, 
resulting in higher credit supply. Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff  (2002a) also 
found that greater firms' belief in courts lead to the granting of more trade credit. 
                                                 
3 In  my study, the survey data renders that I can only investigate the impact of b) on trade credit. 
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 Furthermore, they argued that effective courts lowers barriers to entry for new 
suppliers. Firms that express greater judiciary confidence are 7% less likely to reject a 
new supplier who offers trade credit, presumably this could result in more trade credit 
if the incumbent supplier is not abandoned. 
   Hence, the aim of my study is to empirically substantiate the hypothesis that 
effective legal system increases trade credit. Using the dataset of The World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys, the empirical strategy I follow estimate my model by ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and Tobit while controlling for firm heterogeneity by adding 
firm-specific characteristics and industry dummies. To address the possible 
endogeneity issues (i.e., omitted variables bias, reverse causality and measurement 
error), I use the instrumental variable (IV) approach, and stepwisely include seven 
control variables . For my IV estimator, Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), I 
use as instrument legal origin for the efficiency of legal system. In addition, for the 
subset of ex-colonies in my sample I follow Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 
2002), and use European settler mortality rates in 1600s to 1800s, urbanisation in 
1500 and population density in 1500 as instruments.  
   In my robustness checks, I use alternative measures of the dependent and 
independent variables for the Tobit regressions. Specifically, I alternatively use firms' 
perception of legal services and the Property Rights Index from The Heritage 
Foundation as indicators of the efficiency of legal system, and the ratio of accounts 
receivable over total sales as a proxy for trade credit. In addition, I investigate the 
impact of legal efficiency on trade credit for firms with different borrowing facilities 
and located at countries with different development level. Lastly, I replicate the 
GMM estimations for my baseline specifications with Property Rights Index. 
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    I find positive and significant associations between the efficiency of legal system 
and trade credit for the OLS and Tobit regressions. For the GMM estimation with 
legal origin as the instrument, in the first stage, consistent with the literature, I find 
that legal system is more efficient in enforcing contractual and property rights in 
business disputes in countries with a common law system than in countries with a 
civil law system. When settler mortality rates, urbanisation in 1500 and population 
density in 1500 are alternatively used as the instruments, in accordance with the 
findings of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002), I find a negative relation 
between these variables and the legal system. In the second stage, all my GMM 
results also reveal a positive and significant impact of legal system on trade credit. 
These outcomes are robust to the seven additional controls included stepwisely and 
when I use a different proxy for legal system, that is Property Rights Index. Finally, I 
find that legal system has a larger impact on trade credit for firms in more-developed 
countries or with overdraft facilities. 
    The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the data 
and variables for the empirical study, while Section 3 presents the estimation strategy 
















 2. Data and Variables 
2.1 Data 
Following earlier surveys on establishment business climate, the Enterprise Analysis 
Unit of the World Bank started in 2002 a large-scale project called "The World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys" (WBESs), with the objective to provide the world's most 
comprehensive firm-level data in emerging economies. The WBESs are carried out in 
cooperation with local business organizations and government agencies, and they are 
performed approximately every three years for most countries with different countries 
surveyed at different times. The WBESs include industries from the manufacturing 
sector, service sector, and other sectors such as agriculture and construction, and they 
survey private firms using either a simple random or random stratified sampling 
methodology. 
     The dataset I use in this paper is called Private Enterprise Survey of Productivity 
and the Investment Climate (PESPIC). It is a standardised dataset based on a series of 
WBESs conducted in individual countries for the period of 2002-2006. It was 
compiled by the World Bank as a way to provide researchers with a comparable 
cross-country, firm-level dataset. As the WBESs use different questionnaire designs 
and survey methodologies in different countries and different times not all the 
variables are available in certain countries or in certain periods. Meanwhile, 
compromises are made by the World Bank in order to match some of the variables 
during the standardisation. 
    The PESPIC is a cross-section of data with limited time series aspects and is 
composed of two parts. One is a general questionnaire directed at the senior 
management seeking information about the firm, sales and suppliers, investment 
climate constraints, infrastructure and services, finance, business-government 
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 relations, conflict resolution and legal environment, crime, capacity and innovation, 
and labour relations. The other questionnaire is directed at the accountant manager, 
and it covers various financial measures such as production, sales, expenses, total 
assets and total liabilities. 
      The dataset includes a total of 47,346 firms from 69 emerging economies, 
such as China, India and Russia, among others. It contains 30,238 firms from 16 
manufacturing industries (Textiles, Leather, Garments, Food, Beverages, Metals and 
Machinery, Electronics, Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals, Construction Equipment, 
Wood and Furniture, Non-Metallic and Plastic Materials, Paper, Sport Goods, Auto 
and Auto-Components, Other Transport Equipment and Other Manufacturing), 
13,750 firms from 9 service industries (IT Services, Telecommunications, 
Accounting and Finance, Advertising and Marketing, Retail and Wholesale Trade, 
Hotels and Restaurants, Transport, Real Estate and Rental Services and Other 
Services), 711 firms from the agriculture sector, 2,327 firms from the construction 
sector and 320 firms from other sectors. 
   I also use the Index of Economic Freedom, an annual survey that began in 1995, 
from The Heritage Foundation. Consisting of ten benchmarks, from business freedom 
to labour freedom, it offers a comprehensive measure of economic success for 184 
countries. For my purpose, I only utilise one benchmark, the Property Rights Index, 
as an alternative measure of the independent variable.  
   For the instruments used in this paper, I obtained the data from two different 
sources. I use data for legal origins from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2008). While the data for  Settler Mortality, Population Density in 1500 and 
Urbanisation in 1500 are taken from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002). To 
identify which countries are ex-colonies, I use the Ex-colony dummy variable from 
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 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), where countries that are formerly colonies 
take a value of one. I have 22,621 firms in  the 33 former colonies in my sample. 
    Table 1a presents the surveyed countries, their legal origins, the survey year and 
the corresponding number of surveyed firms, as well as the mean values of the 
dependent and independent variables. In addition, I identify which of the countries 
are ex-colonies and show the values of the instruments used. Appendix 2 gives 
detailed definitions and sources for the variables used in this study. In the following 
sub-sections, I will discuss Trade Credit, Legal System, the instruments and the 
control variables.  
2.2 Trade Credit 
The dependent variable of my analysis is the extent of trade credit, which is measured 
in two ways.  
   First, the PESPIC includes the following question to the senior management "What 
percentage of your establishment's sales is sold on credit, i.e., full payment is not due 
at the time of delivery?" I divide all the answers by 100, so that my dependent 
variable, Trade Credit, will range from 0 to1.  
   Second, I use the ratio of accounts receivable over total sales, and denote it as 
Accounts Receivable Ratio. This is the most commonly-used measure of trade credit 
in the literature [Brennan, Maksimoviz and Zechner (1988); Petersen and Rajan 
(1997); and Ng, Smith and Smith (1999)]. Unfortunately, as information about 
accounts receivable is fragmentary (only available for 13,915 firms in 28 countries or 
30% of the total number of firms in this survey), I use Accounts Receivable Ratio as 
a robustness check and Trade Credit for the main analysis.  
10 
    Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the data. Referring to Table 2, the mean 
value of Trade Credit is 0.450 ( 0.401) and that of Accounts Receivable Ratio is 
0.140 ( 0.163). 
   Column 3 of Table 1a and Column 1 of Table 3 further present the patterns of 
Trade Credit across various categories.  Referring to Column 3 of Table 1a, the top 
five countries with the highest values of Trade Credit are Malaysia in 2002 (with a 
mean value of 0.813), Brazil in 2003 (with a mean value of 0.791), Morocco in 2004 
(with a mean value of 0.744), South Africa in 2003 (with a mean value of 0.742), and 
Thailand in 2004 (with a mean value of 0.692). On the other hand, the top five 
countries with the lowest values of Trade Credit are Uzbekistan in 2003 (with a mean 
value of 0.027), Tajikistan in 2003 (with a mean value of 0.049), Uzbekistan in 2005 
(with a mean value of 0.065), Slovenia in 2002 (with a mean value of 0.078) and 
Croatia in 2002 (with a mean value of 0.096). None of the bottom five countries have 
a common law origin, while three4 of the top five have. 
   From Column 1 of Table 3, countries with a common law system have on average a 
higher mean value of Trade Credit (0.576) than those with a civil law system (0.408). 
Across different sectors, the manufacturing sector is found to have the highest mean 
value of Trade Credit (0.531), followed by other sectors (0.411),  the agriculture 
sector (0.409), the construction sector (0.348) and lastly the service sector (0.266). 
Comparing firms with different borrowing facilities, I find that firms with overdraft 
facilities tend to provide more trade credit (with a mean value of 0.625) than those 
without overdraft facilities (with a mean value of 0.455). I also find that firms located 
in more-developed countries [defined as Gross National Income (GNI) per capita 
above the sample median of US$2120] have a higher mean value of Trade Credit 
                                                 
4  The three countries that have a common law origin are Malaysia, South Africa and Thailand. 
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 (0.502) than those located in less-developed countries (0.382). Finally, I observe that 
firms in countries that are ex-colonies have a higher mean value of Trade Credit 
(0.555) compared with those that are not in former colonies (0.363). This can be 
attributed to the larger percentage of countries with a common law origin among ex-
colonies in my sample. Specifically, 14 of the 16 common law origin countries are 
ex-colonies. 
    Together, these descriptive results suggest a relationship between Trade Credit and 
the family of legal system.  Furthermore the data also shows that Trade Credit can 
vary across firms according to the firm's industry, country location and borrowing 
facilities. 
2.3 Legal System 
The key explanatory variable of this study is the efficiency of legal system.  
   Following the approach of the recent literature on economic institutions [e.g., 
Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002b); Cull and Xu (2005)] , I use the subjective 
measure perceived by the firm. Specifically, the PESPIC has the following question5 
to senior management: "To what degree do you agree with this statement 'I am 
confident that the judicial system will enforce my contractual and property rights in 
business disputes'?" There are six possible answers: (1) fully agree, (2) disagree in 
most cases, (3) tend to disagree, (4) tend to agree, (5) agree in most cases and (6) 
fully agree. Accordingly, I construct the variable - Legal System - with the responses 
varying from 1 to 6 with a higher value indicating a more efficient legal system. From 
Table 2, Legal System has a mean value of 3.676 and a standard deviation of 1.475.  
                                                 
5 Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2008); Yasar, Paul and Ward (2011); and Kaniki (2006) 
also used the same survey question to measure property rights. The first paper explores the link 
between property rights and independent variables (used in influential institutional theories) within an 
ANOVA framework. The second paper uses a two-stage-least-squares approach, namely GMM 
estimation, to determine the impact of property rights on firms' productivity and profitability. While 
the third paper had been discussed in the Introduction. 
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     In robustness checks of the measure of legal system, I use Legal Service as an 
alternative measure because it is only available for 8,113 firms in 20 countries . It is 
based on the senior management's reply to the question "For legal services, for your 
establishment over the last year, please ...... evaluate the quality on a 1-4 scale where 
1 is very poor and 4 is very good". In Table 2, Legal Service has a mean value of 
2.879 and a standard deviation of 0.808.  
   In addition, I use the Property Rights Index from The Heritage Foundation as 
another alternative measure of the efficiency of legal system. The index, as a broad 
measure, is based on the level of protectiveness of the country's property rights laws, 
effectiveness of enforcement, likelihood of expropriation, independence of and 
existence of corruption within the judiciary and enforceability of contracts by 
individuals and firms. It is measured from 10 to 100 with a higher value indicating 
stronger property rights protection. I rescaled it to be 1-6 so as to make it comparable 
to Legal System and renamed it Property Rights. From Table 2, Property Rights takes 
a mean value of 2.845 with a standard deviation of 0.889. For this variable I have it 
for all the countries in 2002-2006 in my sample with the exception of Serbia and 
Montenegro in 2005. As it measures property rights only at the country-level, I use it 
only in the robustness checks. 
    I present the patterns of legal system across different categories in Column (4) of 
Table 1a and Column (2) of Table 3. Although the difference is not as pronounced as 
that with trade credit, I also find that legal system is more efficient in more developed 
countries and countries with a common law system, and that firms with overdraft 




 2.4 Instruments 
The instruments used in my GMM estimation are Legal Origin, Settler Mortality6, 
Population Density 1500 and Urbanisation 1500. Following closely Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2002), I kept Settler Mortality and Population Density 1500 
in logarithm, while Urbanisation 1500 remains in percentage.  
   These three variables are used to instrument for Legal System for the subset of 
former colonies in the sample. In contrast, Legal Origin is used for the full sample. 
   In the full sample, I have 33 ex-colonies and 16 countries with a British common 
law origin, 14 with a German7 legal origin and 39 with a French legal origin. None of 
the emerging countries used in my study has a Scandinavian or socialist legal origin. 
This is because only five countries in the world follow a Scandinavian legal origin, 
but none of them is in my sample of countries. I have no Socialist country as I follow 
the new classification by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008). 
Considering Socialist countries to be transition economies because they revert to their 
previous legal systems (which were French or German) after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the authors reclassified8 these countries into their pre-Russian Revolution or 
pre-World War II systems. 
    Since German and Scandinavian legal origins are considered subsets of the French 
civil law, throughout this paper I consider only two systems of legal origin in my 
paper, which are the British common law and the French civil code9. Dummy 
                                                 
6 Settler Mortality is the estimated Europeans’ settler mortality in colonies during 1600s to 1800s. 
7  The 14 countries are Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Mongolia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
8 With the exception of Cuba, Myanmar and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 
9 Since it is thought that the German legal tradition allows for greater judicial law making than the 
French system [La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008, page 290)], to put at ease worries that 
countries with this legal origin may bias my results, I tried dropping the 14 German legal origin 
countries in my GMM analysis. But I obtained qualitatively similar results to the case when these 
countries are included under the French civil code. 
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 variables are used to denote the two different legal systems, but French civil code is 
dropped to prevent multi-collinearity. Thus, the instrument, Legal Origin, takes a 
value of one for British common law and zero for French civil code. 
   For the reminding instruments, Settler Mortality, Population Density 1500 and 
Urbanisation 1500, I have data for 29, 32 and 21 respectively of the 33 ex-colonies in 
my sample. From Table 2, for ex-colonies the mean values of Settler Mortality, 
Population Density 1500 and Urbanisation 1500 are 4.251 ( 0.734), 1.436 ( 1.648) 
and 7.463 ( 3.823) respectively. Table 1b provides the values for each of these three 
instruments for all the ex-colonies in my sample.       


2.5 Control Variables 
In the empirical analysis, I also control for factors that may affect both the efficiency 
of legal system and the extent of trade credit.  
   Firm size and firm age are used to control for the possible effects of scale economy 
and seniority, and they are also used as proxies for the firm's credit quality in the 
literature [Peterson and Rajan (1997), McMillan and Woodruff (1999), Cuñat (2007), 
etc.]. Thus, I include Firm Size (measured by the logarithm of total employment a 
year ago) and Firm Age (measured by the logarithm of years of establishment up to 
the end of survey year) in the regression. 
    In emerging economies, especially those transforming from former socialist 
systems, governments still exert strong influence on firms' behaviours through their 
ownership controls. For example, Cull, Xu, and Zhu (2009) found that in China poor 
performing, state-owned enterprises were more likely to grant trade credit. 
Recognising this possible ownership effects, I include State Ownership, which is 
measured as the share of equity owned by the government or the state, in the 
regression. 
15 
    Many studies have shown that market structure affects firms' willingness to provide 
trade credit. For example, Fisman and Raturi (2004), using a dataset of buyers in five 
sub-Saharan African countries, found that clients of monopolists had a significantly 
lower probability of receiving trade credit than those dealing with more competitive 
suppliers. Hyndman and Serio (2009), using firm-level data from Indonesia, reported 
an inverse U-shaped relationship between market competition and trade credit, with a 
discontinuous increase in credit provision between monopoly and duopoly. Instead of 
adding many industry-level characteristics, I use industry dummies to control for all 
the possible industry characteristics. 
   In my GMM estimates, I also make use of seven additional control variables, which 
I included stepwise. These controls are Business Registration, Labour Regulation, 
Corruption, Access to Finance, Interest Rates, Efficiency of Government Services 
and GNI10. 
   The first five of these variables are firms' responses in the PESPIC to the question: 
"Please tell us if any of the following issues are a problem for the operation and 
growth of your business". The "issues" include "Business Licensing and Operating 
Permits", "Labour Regulation", "Corruption", "Access to Financing (e.g., collateral)", 
and "Cost of Financing (e.g., interest rates)", among others. The answer ranges from 
0 (no obstacle), to 1 (minor obstacle), to 2 (moderate obstacle), to 3 (major obstacle), 
and to 4 (very severe obstacle). 
   The penultimate variable, Efficiency of Government Services, are firms' replies to 
the question: "How would you generally rate the efficiency of government in 
delivering services (e.g. public utilities, public transportation, security, education and 
health etc.)." The answer ranges from 1 (very inefficient), to 2 (inefficient), to 3 
                                                 
10 This is measured in per capita US$. 
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 (somewhat inefficient), to 4 (somewhat efficient), to 5 (efficient), and to 6 (very 
efficient). 
   Finally, I include GNI to address the concern of a possible violation of the 
exclusion restriction. From Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002), I learnt 
that there is a negative correlation between the instruments: Settler Mortality, 
Population Density in 1500 and Urbanisation in 1500; and a country's income per 
capita. While from my dataset, I have observed in Table 3 that firms in more-
developed countries have a higher mean value of Trade Credit, implying a possible 
deterministic relation between GNI and Trade Credit. Thus a major concern is that 
these instruments may be attributing the effect of GNI on Trade Credit to the 
efficiency of legal system. I deal with this by the inclusion of GNI stepwisely in the 
GMM estimations that make use of these three instruments. For comparison, I also 




















 3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 Estimation Strategy 
My empirical model investigates the relationship between trade credit and the 
efficiency of legal system, while controlling for a variety of firms characteristics. The 
regression equation representing this relationship, which I am going to estimate, is as 
follows  
 y fic = α + β R fic + X' fic γ + ɛ fic           (3) 
  
 
where the subscripts: f, i and c indicate the firm, industry and country respectively. 
The dependent variable (y) represents the firm's level of trade credit, for which I use 
two proxies (Trade Credit or Accounts Receivable Ratio). For the key independent 
variable (R), efficiency of legal system, it is measured as Legal System, Legal 
Service or Property Rights. For the other independent variable (X), which is a set of 
controls, I include Firm Size, Firm Age, State Ownership and industry dummies. The 
error term is simply represented by ɛ. 
   I begin with the most commonly used estimation method, OLS, but also use a two-
sided truncated Tobit regression. For all my robustness tests, I use the latter. This is 
because both measurements of the dependent variable range between 0 and 1, 
rendering Tobit regression more appropriate than OLS. 
   To deal with possible heteroskadasticity, I use White-robust standard error for all 
the estimations used in this paper. 
   Unfortunately, there remains a number of issues with the estimation of (3), that 
OLS and Tobit regressions will not be able to resolve. One of the most fundamental 
assumptions for OLS and Tobit to generate accurate and unbiased estimates of the 
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 coefficients on the key independent variables is the exogeneity of these variables, that 
is they must be uncorrelated with the error term [i.e. E(R ɛ) = 0]. However, for (3) 
this is not assured due to three reasons. First, Legal System and Legal Service are 
based on firms' perceptions; rendering these measurements subjective and prone to 
measurement errors since senior management may provide incorrect answers for 
different reasons. This measurement error, M, would create an attenuation bias 
toward 0. Secondly, even with the set of controls, R may still be correlated with the 
error term. It is near impossible to include in the regression all the variables that R is 
correlated with, either because of a lack of data for these variables or the technical 
problems associated with adding too many variables, like over-fitting. Omitted 
variables bias, thus, becomes a corollary. Finally, the dependent variable could affect 
the independent variable, resulting in reverse causality. For example, firms that 
provide more trade credit could be more preoccupied with the settlement of business 
disputes, and consequently have greater incentives to initiate changes in the legal 
system that will benefit themselves11.  
   Hence, to solve for the endogeneity of legal system, I make use of instrumental 
variables estimation. This approach will not only be able to address the potential 
issues of omitted variables bias and reverse causality, but also correct for 
measurement error if I assume that the error has the classical orthogonal properties, 
that is, it is uncorrelated with the proxy for the efficiency of legal system (i.e., E(R M) 
= 0). 
                                                 
11 Indeed, when I regress Legal System on Trade Credit using OLS, I found that the coefficient on the 
latter to be positive and statistically significant at 1% level for all the specifications I ran. These 
specifications utilised the same set of controls as in Table 4, in other words, I first ran the baseline 
regression, then with industry dummies, and finally included Firm Size, Firm Age, and State 




    But, first and foremost, I need to find a valid instrument for R. Many theories have 
been advanced to establish the underlying determinants of a country's current 
institutional quality and economic development. La Porta et al. (1998) argues for the 
importance of legal origins in shaping law enforcement and the rights of shareholders 
and creditors in a country. In a more encompassing study, La Porta et al. (1999) made 
use of a range of explanatory variables: latitude, legal origins, religions and 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, to explore the causality between these variables and 
the quality of governments in a multiple regression framework. Complementing the 
1999 paper of La Porta et al., Alesina et al. (2003) came up with new measures of 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization and regress the various indicators of 
government quality on them. On a similar note, Easterly and Levine (1997) stressed 
the importance of ethnic diversity on economic growth for a broad section of African 
and non-African countries. In Stulza and Williamson's (2003) paper, they explored 
how culture, proxied by language and religion, affects investor's protection in 
multiple regression. 
   I choose to follow the influential works of La Porta et al. (1998, 1999), and selected 
legal origin as the instrument. I believe it is a more plausible instrument compared to 
the other determinants mentioned above as it suffers from fewer endogeneity issues. 
For example, ethnic composition and culture are likely to have influence on the 
provision of trade credit, not just through legal system and law enforcement, but 
through business attitudes as well. Whereas latitude has been demonstrated to have 
correlation with ethnic fragmentation. For example, it has been used as an instrument 
for ethno-linguistic fragmentation in Campos and Kutzeyev's (2007) paper. 
   On the other hand, legal origin has a direct bearing on a country's current legal 
environment, presumably, because of the pervasive nature of legal institutions. In 
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 their paper La Porta et al. (1998) found that countries with a British common law 
tradition are more protective of the property rights of all investors, whether 
shareholders or creditors, and have stronger law enforcement than countries using 
civil law codes. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) found a similar relationship. 
Furthermore, legal systems are exogenous if they were transplanted involuntarily 
through conquest and colonisation. When the systems were adopted voluntarily "the 
crucial consideration was language and the broad political stance of the law rather 
than the treatment of investor protections" (La Porta et al, 1998, page 1126). Thus 
legal origin could be considered exogenous. Subsequent studies have also used legal 
origin as the instrument for the efficiency of courts in enforcing contracts and 
resolving business disputes, for example, Djankov et al. (2003), La Porta et al. (2004) 
and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). 
   The equation for the first stage of my instrumental variables estimation is defined as  
 R fic = δ + η L c + X' fic λ + μ fic (4) 
where L c12 is the legal origin of country c. 
   A potential concern with my instrumental variable estimation is that legal origin 
may not be exogenous. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) cautioned 
against the use of legal origin in instrumental variable estimation because of its 
impacts on many other aspects of the economy, such as regulation of entry, regulation 
of labour markets, corruption, the development of financial institutions, government 
ownership of banks, and quality of government services. These aspects may have 
impacts on firms' willingness to offer trade credit, which leads to the violation of the 
exclusion restriction of the instrumental variable estimation. For example, it has been 
                                                 
12 For the subset of ex-colonies, L c denotes Settler Mortality, Population Density 1500 or Urbanisation 
1500. 
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 shown that the common law system is associated with more developed financial 
institutions [La Porta et al. (1997, 1998); Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007)], less 
regulation of entry and less corruption [Djankov et al. (2002)], less government 
ownership of banks and lower interest rates [La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2002)], higher quality of government services [La Porta et al. (1999)], and lower 
levels of labour regulation [Botero et al. (2004)]. If these other aspects of the 
economy also have impacts on firms' willingness to provide trade credit, it means that 
legal origin may affect my outcome variables through channels other than the 
efficiency of legal system, causing the violation of the exclusion restriction of my 
instrumental variable estimation. 
     To address this concern, I construct additional control variables that are  related to 
most of these potential channels, and stepwisely include them in the GMM 
regressions, with both stages having the same controls. 
    I, now, turn to the subset of former colonies in my dataset. For these countries I 
utilise Settler Mortality, Population Density 1500 and Urbanisation 1500 as the 
instruments. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) posited that European 
colonisation during the 1500s to early 1900s shaped the type of institutions in the 
colonies. In poor, sparely-populated areas and areas with low European mortality 
rates (i.e. settler colonies), the Europeans would migrate there and thus establish 
institutions that protected property rights. While in areas with the opposite 
characteristics (i.e. extractive colonies), Europeans would expropriate the existing 
resources and develop elitist and extractive systems. These systems are pervasive, 
and affected the institutional quality and, consequently, the prosperity of the areas till 
today. In areas with egalitarian institutions development was facilitated during the 
Industrial Revolution. Thus these instruments are negatively correlated (relevant) 
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 with today's institutional quality, but they are also exogenous as they are likely to be 
relatively less related to the error term in the second stage of the GMM estimation.  
3.2 Tobit and OLS Results 
 
The Tobit regression results are reported in Columns 1-3 of Table 4.  
   As shown in Column 1, Legal System has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on Trade Credit. To gauge the economic significance of this result, I calculate 
that a one standard deviation increase in the efficiency of legal system is associated 
with an increase of 0.023 x 1.475 = 0.034 in the extent of trade credit or 0.085 
standard-deviation of the extent of trade credit. For a deeper interpretation, I compare 
Bangladesh, the country with the lowest mean value for Legal System (2.373), with 
Oman, the country with the highest mean value (4.825). These values imply that if 
Bangladesh has an equivalent Legal System to Oman, its trade credit will increase 
from 0.0546 to 0.1110.  
   Moving on, in Columns (2) to (3), I first include industry dummies, followed by 
Firm Size, Firm Age, and State Ownership, and find that the positive impact of legal 
system on trade credit remains robust to these controls. 
   Among these controls13, the coefficients of firm size and firm age are positive and 
significant in all specifications. Apparently, firms with larger workforces and longer 
history are more likely to provide trade credit. This is consistent with the findings in 
the literature on the determinants of trade credit [Peterson and Rajan (1997), 
McMillan and Woodruff (1999), Cuñat (2007), etc]. 
   Meanwhile, the coefficient of state ownership is negative and significant in all 
                                                 
13 The causal interpretation of the coefficients on control variables should be treated with caution as 
they may be correlated with the error term, although the key independent variable, R, need not be. The 
endogeneity of the controls still satisfies the conditional mean independence assumption needed for 
unbiased estimate of the coefficient of R [See Stock and Watson (2012, page 274)]. 
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 specifications, suggesting that firms with greater government controls are less likely 
to grant trade credit to their suppliers. This is in contrast to the findings by Cull, Xu, 
and Zhu (2009) in the context of China. One possible explanation is that other 
emerging economies may not share the same institutional environment as China. As a 
financially repressive regime, in China access to formal financing (mainly bank loans) 
is strictly regulated by the government [Li (2001), Lal (2006)]. Government 
regulations, together with state ownership of banks, lead to discrimination in bank 
lending based on a firm's ownership status. State-owned firms are favoured by the 
central and local governments and have easy access to bank loans, while non-state-
owned firms, especially those profitable and productive private ones, are short of 
financial resources [Huang (2003)]. As a result, state-owned firms are more likely to 
provide trade credit to the well-performing private firms in China to prop up their 
operations [Cull, Xu and Zhu (2009)]. 
   In Columns 4-6 of Table 4, I repeat the analysis using the OLS estimation. It is 
clear that the OLS estimates are qualitatively similar to the Tobit estimates14, 
although the magnitude of the marginal effect of Legal System on Trade Credit 
decreased by 48.7%  for the former for the base specification. 
3.3 GMM Results 
I, next, present my GMM results in Table 5a to Table 5d. For all the tables, in 
Column (1) I have the baseline specification, followed by the specification with 
industry dummies and firm-characteristic controls. Finally, additional controls to 
solve for the endogeneity of the instruments are included stepwise in columns (3) to 
(9). The first stage results of the two-step GMM estimation are displayed in the 
bottom-half part of each table, while the top-half shows the second stage results.   
                                                 
14 I obtain quantitatively similar results when I ran the Tobit and OLS regression for ex-colonies only. 
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    I begin with Table 5a  where I ran the GMM regressions for the full sample of 
countries with Legal Origin as the instrument. In the first stage, it is found that the 
estimated coefficients on Legal Origin is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level for all specifications, suggesting that firms in countries with a common law 
system perceive a more efficient legal system in protecting their contractual and 
property rights in business disputes than those in countries with a civil law system. 
This is consistent with the findings in the literature [e.g., Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches and Shleifer 
(2004); Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)]. Meanwhile, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic15 confirms that the instrument variable is relevant, and the Cragg-Donald F-
test rules out the concern of a weak instrument16. 
    In the second stage, my findings reveal that the efficiency of legal system, after 
being instrumented by legal origins of the corresponding country, has a positive and 
statistically significant impact at 1% level on the extent of trade credit for all 
specifications. This suggests that that my hypothesis regarding the importance of 
legal system for trade credit is robust.  
   Nevertheless, I observe that when controls are added, as in columns (2) to (9), the 
effect of legal system on trade credit is cut approximately by half in relation to the 
baseline specification. This estimated effect is not sensitive to which specific controls 
are added. 
   For the subset of ex-colonies in my sample, I make use of three other instruments, 
namely, Settler Mortality, Population Density in 1500 and Urbanisation in 1500. The 
GMM results are presented in tables 5b to 5d. I find similar outcomes for each of 
                                                 
15 Thu null hypothesis  of  un-identification is rejected (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). 
16 The F-statistic is significantly above the critical value (10) of the "safe zone" for a strong instrument 
(Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
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 these instruments for all specifications. In accordance with the findings of Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002), I note that the estimated effect of these 
instruments on Legal System to be negative and statistically significant at 1% level, 
with the only exception of Population Density in 1500 in Column (9) of Table 5c. 
The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic and the Cragg-Donald F-test confirm the 
relevance of the instruments. In the second stage, the estimated coefficients on Legal 
System are invariably positive, and nearly always statistically significant at 1%.   
   Meanwhile, for all four tables, I observe a common trend. The coefficients on 
Business Registration, Labour Regulation, Corruption and GNI are always positive 
and usually statistically significant, while Efficiency of Government Services has a 
negative and significant coefficient. These results imply that as a country's economic 
status improves firms facing more severe operating obstacles are more likely to offer 
trade credit to their customers17. One possible explanation is that competition 
increases as a country develops, thus firms having problems in their operations are 
more likely to be at disadvantageous positions in the market, and have low bargaining 
power with their trading partners. Hence, they are forced to offer trade credit; 
otherwise, they may lose contracts. 
3.4 Robustness Checks 
 
We further carry out four other sets of robustness checks on the impact of legal 
system on trade credit. First, I re-estimate equation (1) using alternative measures of 
trade credit and legal system. Table 6 reports the Tobit regression results. In columns 
(1) and (2), I use Accounts Receivable Ratio to measure the extent of trade credit, 
while in columns (3) and (4), I use Legal Service to measure the efficiency of legal 
                                                 
17 The causal interpretation of the coefficients on control variables should be treated with caution as 
they may be correlated with the error term, although the key independent variable, R, need not be. The 
endogeneity of the controls still satisfies the conditional mean independence assumption needed for 
unbiased estimate of the coefficient of R [See Stock and Watson (2012, page 274)]. 
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 system. Finally, in columns (5) and (6), I use the Property Rights index from The 
Heritage Foundation as another proxy for the efficiency of legal system. Clearly, my 
earlier finding about the impact of legal system on trade credit are robust to these 
alternative measures. 
   Second, I split the sample into two sub-samples based on the firm's financial status: 
a sub-sample of firms with overdraft facilities and a sub-sample of firms without 
overdraft facilities. It is expected that compared with those without overdraft facilities, 
firms having overdraft facilities are relatively more capital abundant and are thus 
more capable of providing trade credit when the legal environment is improved. The 
Tobit regression results are reported in Table 7. It is found that the coefficient of 
Legal System is 0.033 and is statistically significant at the 1% level for the sub-
sample of firms with overdraft facilities [Column (2)], while it is 0.011 and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level for the sub-sample of firms without overdraft 
facilities [Column (4)]. Thus, in terms of both the statistical significance and the 
economic magnitude, the efficiency of legal system has a larger impact on trade 
credit for firms with overdraft facilities than those without, which is consistent with 
my conjecture.  
   Third, I investigate whether legal system has a differential impact on trade credit 
for firms located in countries at different development stages. McMillan and 
Woodruff (2002) argued that in the early stage of economic reform and economic 
transition, formal institutions are less important because informal contractual 
arrangements can be self-enforcing due to a lack of business partners18. However, 
along with the economic development, market-supporting institutions such as legal 
system become more important to a firm's operations. This is because the growth of 
                                                 
18 See McMillan and Woodruff (2002), page 159-162, for the full set of reasons. 
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business requires the firm to do businesses with unfamiliar people located farther 
away. This increases the instances of business disputes, and thus how to resolve these 
disputes efficiently becomes essential to support firm expansion and growth. To 
proxy for the economic development level, I use the GNI per capita, and define a 
country as "more-developed" if its GNI per capita is above the sample median of 
US$2120 and as "less-developed" otherwise. The Tobit regression results are 
reported in Table 8. It is clear that legal system has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on trade credit for firms located in more-developed countries, but 
becomes less significant, or not at all in less-developed countries with a full set of 
controls. This confirms the argument of McMillan and Woodruff (2002). 
   In the last robustness test, I replicate columns (1) and (2) of tables 5 for each of the 
instrument, with the only difference that I substitute the Property Rights index from 
The Heritage Foundation for Legal System. The results are presented in Table 9. 
As is evident, the outcome substantiates my hypothesis of the importance of legal 
system on trade credit, although the estimated magnitude of its effect has fallen.
 4. Conclusion 
In this article, I attempt to fill a void in the literature about property rights and trade 
credit. Indeed, trade credit has been proven to be an important source of finance in 
countries with less developed financial markets, which both emerging and developed 
economies could suffer from. 
   Making use of firm-level data for 69 emerging economies, I ran several OLS and 
Tobit regressions, both with and without industry dummies and firm-specific 
characteristics. I find a positive and significant association between the efficiency of 
a country's legal system and the provision of trade credit by firms. This outcome is 
robust to alternative measures of the dependent and independent variables. To address 
the endogeneity of legal system, I employ the GMM method. 
  While other studies have documented the prevalence of trade credit in the absence  
of specialised financial intermediaries and strong property rights protection, the 
authors often explore diverse reasons -as reviewed in the Introduction - for the 
willingness of firms to offer credit. These reasons may obviate the need for a strong 
legal environment. However I believe that all of the factors need not be mutually 
exclusive. In McMillan and Woodruff (2002), the authors, too, argue that legal 
system fosters trade credit, along with informal relationships. 
   Thus, for future research, it will be interesting to investigate the relative importance 
of formal institutions (such as legal system) and informal institutions (such as 
relationship) on the provision of trade credit. Other spheres of the legal environment, 
like the cost and ease of legislation procedure, cost of legal enforcement and contents 
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 Appendix 1. Variables Definitions and Sources 
 
 
Variable Variable Definition Source 
Dependent variables   
Trade Credit This is a variable, based on the reply to the survey 
question "What percentage of your establishment's 
sales is sold on credit, i.e., full payment is not due at 
the time of delivery?" All the answers are divided by 
100, so it ranges from 0 to1.  
World Business Environment Survey 
Accounts Receivable 
Ratio 
This is a variable based on Accounts receivable over 
Total Sales. It varies from 0 to 1. 
World Business Environment Survey 
Independent variables   
Legal System This is a categorical variable, based on the reply to the 
survey question “To what degree do you agree with 
this statement ‘I am confident that the judicial system 
will enforce my contractual and 
property rights in business disputes’?” It takes value 
from 1 to 6, with a higher value indicating a more 
efficient legal system. 
World Business Environment Survey 
Legal Service This is a categorical variable, based on the reply to the 
survey question "For legal services, for your 
establishment over the last year, please ...... evaluate 
the quality on a 1-4 scale where 1 is very poor and 4 is 
very good". It takes value from 1 to 4, with a higher 
value indicating a more efficient legal system. 
World Business Environment Survey 
Property Rights This is a categorical variable, based on the level of 
protectiveness of the country's property rights laws, 
effectiveness of enforcement, likelihood of 
The Heritage Foundation 
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 expropriation, independence of and existence of 
corruption within the judiciary and enforceability of 
contracts by individuals and firms. It is measured 
from 10 to 100 with a higher value indicating stronger 
property rights protection. I re-scaled it to be 1 to 6. 
Instruments   
Legal Origin This is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
country follows the British common law system, and 
0 otherwise. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) 
Settler Mortality "Logarithm of estimated settler mortality. Settler 
mortality is calculated from the mortality rates of 
European-born soldiers, sailors, and bishops when 
stationed in colonies. It measures the effect of local 
diseases on people without inherited or acquired 
immunities." 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) 
Population Density in 
1500 
"Logarithm of population density (total population 
divided by total arable land) in 1 A.D., 1500." 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) 
Urbanisation 1500 "Percentage of population living in urban areas with a 
population of at least 5000 in 1500." 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) 
Controls   
Firm Size This variable is the logarithm of the average number 
of workers in the firm 1 year ago. 
World Business Environment Survey 
Firm Age This variable is based on the difference between the 
survey year and the reply to the survey question: "In 
what year did your firm begin operations in this 
country?" I use the logarithm of this difference. 
World Business Environment Survey 
State Ownership This variable is based on the reply to the survey 
question: "What percentage of your firm is owned by 
Government/State?" I divided it by 100. 
World Business Environment Survey 
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 Industry Dummies Dummy variable indicating which industry the firm 
belongs to. 
World Business Environment Survey 
Business Registration This categorical variable is based on the reply to the 
survey question: "Please tell us if any of the following 
issues are a problem for the operation and growth of 
your business", with issue being "Business Licensing 
and Operating Permits". It ranges from 0 to 4 with a 
higher value indicting greater obstacle. 
World Business Environment Survey 
Labour Regulation This categorical variable is based on the reply to the 
survey question: "Please tell us if any of the following 
issues are a problem for the operation and growth of 
your business", with issue being "Labour Regulation". It 
ranges from 0 to 4 with a higher value indicting greater 
obstacle. 
World Business Environment Survey 
Corruption This categorical variable is based on the reply to the 
survey question: "Please tell us if any of the following 
issues are a problem for the operation and growth of 
your business", with issue being "Corruption". It ranges 
from 0 to 4 with a higher value indicting greater 
obstacle. 
World Business Environment Survey 
Access to Finance This categorical variable is based on the reply to the 
survey question: "Please tell us if any of the following 
issues are a problem for the operation and growth of 
your business", with issue being "Access to Financing 
(e.g., collateral)". It ranges from 0 to 4 with a higher 
value indicting greater obstacle. 
World Business Environment Survey 
Interest Rates This categorical variable is based on the reply to the 
survey question: "Please tell us if any of the following 
issues are a problem for the operation and growth of 
World Business Environment Survey 
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 your business", with issue being "Cost of Financing 
(e.g., interest rates)". It ranges from 0 to 4 with a higher 
value indicting greater obstacle. 
Efficiency of 
Government Services 
This categorical variable is based on the reply to the 
survey question: "How would you generally rate the 
efficiency of government in delivering services (e.g. 
public utilities, public transportation, security, 
education and health etc.)."  It takes values from 1 to 
6 with a higher value indicting greater efficiency. 
World Business Environment Survey 
GNI Gross National Income per capita in US$ World Business Environment Survey 
Others   
Ex-Colonies This is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
country is a former colony, and 0 otherwise. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) 
Overdraft This categorical variable is based on the reply to the 
survey question: "Do you have an overdraft facility or 
line of credit?" It takes the value of 2 if "Yes" and 1 if  
"No". I re-scaled it to be 1 or 0 respectively. 











 Appendix 2. Tables 
Table 1a: Data Description 
Country Year Number of Firms Trade Credit Legal System Property Rights Legal Origin Ex-Colonies
         
Albania 2002 170 0.299 3.301 2.111 0 0 
 2005 204 0.382 3.540 2.111   
Armenia 2002 171 0.196 3.476 3.222 0 0 
 2005 351 0.169 3.466 3.222   
Azerbaijan 2002 170 0.182 3.981 2.111 0 0 
 2005 350 0.208 3.985 2.111   
Bangladesh 2002 1001 0.195 2.373 2.111 1 1 
Belarus 2002 250 0.306 3.448 2.111 0 0 
 2005 325 0.206 3.915 2.111   
Benin 2004 197 0.262 2.715 2.111 0 1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002 182 0.124 3.693 1.000 0 0 
 2005 200 0.403 3.481 1.000   
Brazil 2003 1642 0.791 3.770 3.222 0 1 
Bulgaria 2002 250 0.219 3.229 3.222 0 0 
 2005 300 0.266 3.091 2.111   
Cambodia 2003 503 0.286 3.115 2.111 0 0 
Chile 2004 948 0.690 4.264 5.444 0 1 
China 2002 1548 0.334 4.581 2.111 0 0 
Costa Rica 2005 343 0.525 4.061 3.222 0 1 
Croatia 2002 187 0.096 3.729 2.111 0 0 
 2005 236 0.541 3.948 2.111   
Czech 2002 268 0.128 3.546 4.333 0 0 
 2005 343 0.384 3.206 4.333   
Ecuador 2003 453 0.682 2.535 2.111 0 1 
El Salvador 2003 465 0.535 3.425 3.222 0 1 
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 Estonia 2002 170 0.418 3.818 4.333 0 0 
 2005 219 0.519 3.898 4.333   
Republic of Macedonia 2002 170 0.201 3.353 2.111 0 0 
 2005 200 0.359 3.166 2.111   
Georgia 2002 174 0.223 3.040 2.111 0 0 
 2005 200 0.242 3.852 2.111   
Greece 2005 546 0.347 4.404 3.222 0 0 
Guatemala 2003 455 0.518 2.691 2.111 0 1 
Guyana 2004 163 0.293 3.745 3.222 1 1 
Honduras 2003 450 0.419 3.186 3.222 0 1 
Hungary 2002 250 0.476 3.794 4.333 0 0 
 2005 610 0.561 3.284 4.333   
India 2002 1827 0.657 4.130 3.222 1 1 
 2006 4234 0.609 4.045 3.222   
Indonesia 2003 713 0.503 3.812 2.111 0 1 
Ireland 2005 501 0.634 3.983 5.444 1 0 
Jamaica 2005 94 0.517 4.000 3.222 1 1 
Kazakhstan 2002 250 0.211 3.507 2.111 0 0 
 2005 585 0.132 3.563 2.111   
Kenya 2003 284 0.685 3.413 3.222 1 1 
Kyrgyzstan 2002 173 0.125 3.090 2.111 0 0 
 2003 102 0.326 2.700 2.111   
 2005 202 0.163 3.367 2.111   
Laos 2006 246 0.370 4.483 1.000 0 1 
Latvia 2002 176 0.397 3.516 3.222 0 0 
 2005 205 0.399 3.492 3.222   
Lebanon 2006 354 0.581 2.715 2.111 0 0 
Lesotho 2003 75 0.524 3.662 3.222 1 1 
Lithuania 2002 200 0.549 3.205 3.222 0 0 
 2004 239 0.659 2.971 3.222   
 2005 205 0.519 3.328 3.222   
Madagascar 2005 293 0.386 3.463 3.222 0 1 
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 Malawi 2005 160 0.516 4.209 3.222 1 1 
Malaysia 2002 902 0.813 4.197 3.222 1 1 
Mali 2003 155 0.222 3.543 3.222 0 1 
Mauritius 2005 212 0.618 3.956 4.333 0 1 
Moldova 2002 174 0.223 2.930 3.222 0 0 
 2003 103 0.471 2.663 3.222   
 2005 350 0.312 3.024 3.222   
Mongolia 2004 195 0.203 3.697 3.222 0 0 
Morocco 2004 850 0.744 3.757 2.111 0 1 
Nicaragua 2003 452 0.325 2.995 2.111 0 1 
Oman 2003 337 0.494 4.825 3.222 0 0 
Pakistan 2002 965 0.438 2.890 2.111 1 1 
Peru 2002 576 0.454 3.904 2.111 0 1 
Philippines 2003 716 0.558 3.718 3.222 0 1 
Poland 2002 500 0.333 3.475 4.333 0 0 
 2003 108 0.461 2.913 4.333   
 2005 975 0.399 3.413 3.222   
Portugal 2005 505 0.400 3.481 4.333 0 0 
Romania 2002 255 0.301 3.598 2.111 0 0 
 2005 600 0.445 3.630 2.111   
Russia 2002 506 0.196 3.010 2.111 0 0 
 2005 601 0.142 3.020 2.111   
Senegal 2003 262 0.445 3.548 3.222 0 1 
Serbia and Montenegro 2002 250 0.212 3.963 2.111 0 0 
 2003 508 0.361 3.637 2.111   
 2005 300 0.438 3.466 .   
Slovakia 2002 170 0.173 3.413 3.222 0 0 
 2005 220 0.402 3.575 3.222   
Slovenia 2002 188 0.078 3.495 3.222 0 0 
 2005 223 0.635 3.899 3.222   
South Africa 2003 603 0.742 4.280 3.222 1 1 
Sri Lanka 2004 452 0.489 3.998 3.222 1 1 
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 Tajikistan 2002 176 0.157 3.914 2.111 0 0 
 2003 107 0.049 2.635 2.111   
 2005 200 0.099 3.901 2.111   
Tanzania 2003 276 0.414 3.223 2.111 1 1 
Thailand 2004 1385 0.692 4.075 3.222 1 0 
Turkey 2002 514 0.459 3.808 3.222 0 0 
 2004 557 0.380 4.217 3.222   
 2005 1323 0.688 3.381 3.222   
Uganda 2003 300 0.313 4.021 3.222 1 1 
Ukraine 2002 463 0.222 3.428 2.111 0 0 
 2005 594 0.164 3.449 2.111   
Uzbekistan 2002 260 0.146 4.362 2.111 0 0 
 2003 100 0.027 4.165 2.111   
 2005 300 0.065 3.749 2.111   
Vietnam 2005 1650 0.411 4.330 1.000 0 1 
Zambia 2002 207 0.641 3.891 3.222 1 1 
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 Table 1b: Instruments Data Description for Ex-colonies 
Country Year Number of Firms Settler Mortality  Population Density in 1500 Urbanisation in 1500
       
Bangladesh 2002 1001 4.268 3.165 8.54 
Benin 2004 197 5.585 1.442 . 
Brazil 2003 1642 4.263 -2.135 0 
Chile 2004 948 4.233 -0.222 0 
Costa Rica 2005 343 4.358 0.432 9.2 
Ecuador 2003 453 4.263 0.773 10.62 
El Salvador 2003 465 4.358 0.432 9.2 
Guatemala 2003 455 4.263 0.432 9.2 
Guyana 2004 163 3.471 -1.546 0 
Honduras 2003 450 4.358 0.432 9.2 
India 2002 1827 3.884 3.165 8.54 
 2006 4234    
Indonesia 2003 713 5.136 1.453 7.27 
Jamaica 2005 94 4.868 1.530 3 
Kenya 2003 284 4.977 0.969 . 
Laos 2006 246 4.942 0.550 7.27 
Lesotho 2003 75 . -0.711 . 
Madagascar 2005 293 6.284 0.185 . 
Malawi 2005 160 . -0.236 . 
Malaysia 2002 902 2.874 0.197 7.27 
Mali 2003 155 7.986 0.000 . 
Mauritius 2005 212 3.418 . . 
Morocco 2004 850 4.359 2.206 17.79 
Nicaragua 2003 452 5.096 0.432 9.2 
Pakistan 2002 965 3.611 3.165 8.54 
Peru 2002 576 4.263 0.446 10.49 
Philippines 2003 716 . 0.517 3 
Senegal 2003 262 5.104 1.442 . 
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South Africa 2003 603 2.741 -0.711 . 
Sri Lanka 2004 452 4.246 2.739 8.54 
Tanzania 2003 276 5.635 0.683 . 
Uganda 2003 300 5.635 2.017 . 
Vietnam 2005 1650 4.942 1.816 7.27 
Zambia 2002 207 . -0.236 . 
 Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Trade Credit 44,571 0.450 0.401 0 1 
Accounts Receivable Ratio 13,915 0.140 0.163 0 1 
Legal System 43,953 3.676 1.475 1 6 
Legal Service 8,113 2.879 0.808 1 4 
Property Rights 47,107 2.845 0.889 1 5.444
Firm Size 45,292 3.461 1.709 0 11.097
Firm Age 40,642 2.548 0.773 0 5.568
State Ownership 46,243 0.061 0.226 0 1 
Business Registration 45,280 1.000 1.180 0 4 
Labour Regulation 45,475 1.077 1.216 0 4 
Corruption 45,497 1.540 1.443 0 4 
Access to Finance 45,529 1.458 1.389 0 4 
Interest Rates 43,929 1.689 1.394 0 4 
Efficiency of Government Services 15,142 3.116 1.316 1 6 
GNI (per capita in US$) 38,455 3264.484 4733.025 170 34,280
Settler Mortality (for Ex-colonies only) 21,463 4.251 0.734 2.741 7.986
Population Density in 1500 (for Ex-colonies only) 22,409 1.436 1.648 -2.135 3.165
Urbanisation in 1500 (for Ex-colonies only) 19,597 7.463 3.823 0 17.790
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Table 3: Patterns of Trade Credit and Legal System 
  1 2 
  Trade Credit Legal System 
Across Legal Origins   
Common Law 0.576 3.792 
Civil Law 0.408 3.636 
Across Sectors   
Agriculture 0.409 3.677 
Manufacturing 0.531 3.695 
Service 0.266 3.640 
Construction 0.348 3.578 
Other 0.411 3.850 
Across Firms with Different Financial Constraints   
Firms with Overdraft Facility 0.625 3.753 
Firms without Overdraft Facility 0.455 3.646 
Across Countries with Different Development Levels   
Firms in More-developed Countries 0.502 3.779 
Firms in Less-developed Countries 0.382 3.541 
Across Countries with Different Colonial Status    
Firms in Ex-Colonies 0.555 3.733 
Firms not in Ex-Colonies 0.363 3.627 
 
 Table 4: Tobit and OLS Results 
All the regressions include the constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not 
reported to save space (available upon request). White-robust standard errors are 
reported in the bracket. *, **, *** represent the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Estimation Tobit OLS 
Legal System 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.008***
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Controls        
Firm Size   0.040***   0.021***
    [0.002]   [0.001] 
Firm Age   0.060***   0.038***
    [0.005]   [0.003] 
State Ownership   -0.354***   -0.194***
    [0.017]   [0.009] 
Industry Dummy No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 43,196 42,687 36,600 43,196 42,687 36,600 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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 Table 5a: GMM Estimates for Full Sample with Legal Origin as Instrument 
All the regressions include the constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not reported to save space (available upon request). The first 
stage of all the regressions include the same controls as in the corresponding second stage, but the estimated coefficients of these controls are 
not reported to save space (available upon request). White-robust standard errors are reported in the bracket. *, **, *** represent the statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Panel A, Second Stage: Dependent Variable is Trade Credit   
Legal System 1.073*** 0.387*** 0.451*** 0.499*** 0.538*** 0.612*** 0.602*** 0.287*** 0.365*** 
  [0.116] [0.085] [0.081] [0.087] [0.102] [0.135] [0.135] [0.040] [0.039] 
Business Registration    0.078*** 0.053*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 
    [0.014] [0.012] [0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.005] [0.006] 
Labour Regulation    0.076*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.027*** 0.020*** 
     [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] 
Corruption     0.093*** 0.098*** 0.092*** 0.031*** 0.041*** 
      [0.017] [0.021] [0.020] [0.006] [0.006] 
Access to Finance      0.030*** 0.010 -0.006 -0.003 
       [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] 
Interest Rates        0.030*** 0.017*** 0.015** 
        [0.008] [0.005] [0.006] 
Efficiency of Government Services         -0.102*** -0.117***
         [0.011] [0.012] 
GNI          0.000*** 
          [0.000] 
Controls          
Firm Size  -0.006 -0.014* -0.022*** -0.021** -0.024** -0.023** 0.0001 -0.009* 
   [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.005] [0.005] 
Firm Age  0.035*** 0.038*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.003 -0.001 
   [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] 
State Ownership  -0.303*** -0.298*** -0.297*** -0.292*** -0.318*** -0.317*** -0.279*** -0.274***
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    [0.029] [0.025] [0.026] [0.027] [0.036] [0.035] [0.026] [0.030] 
Industry Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B, First Stage: Dependent Variable is Legal System   
Legal Origin 0.154*** 0.112*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.123*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.294*** 0.366*** 
  [0.017] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.031] [0.033] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic [86.36]*** [26.96]*** [37.88]*** [38.92]*** [32.20]*** [22.74]*** [22.12]*** [87.11]*** [123.75]***
Cragg-Donald F-test [89.73] [28.11] [38.93] [39.92] [33.20] [23.48] [22.86] [89.55] [125.11] 
Number of Observations 43,196 36,600 35,496 35,098 34,126 33,271 32,902 11,484 11,296 
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 Table 5b: GMM Estimates for Ex-Colonies with Settler Mortality as Instrument 
 
All the regressions include the constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not reported to save space (available upon request). The first 
stage of all the regressions include the same controls as in the corresponding second stage, but the estimated coefficients of these controls are 
not reported to save space (available upon request). White-robust standard errors are reported in the bracket. *, **, *** represent the statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Panel A, Second Stage: Dependent Variable is Trade Credit   
Legal System 1.036*** 0.583*** 0.595*** 0.517*** 0.649*** 0.717*** 0.730*** 0.521*** 0.435***
  [0.127] [0.065] [0.066] [0.055] [0.084] [0.104] [0.107] [0.058] [0.071] 
Business Registration    0.102*** 0.062*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.022** 0.019** 
    [0.012] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.009] [0.008] 
Labour Regulation    0.065*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.022*** 0.020***
     [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] 
Corruption     0.104*** 0.105*** 0.103*** 0.050*** 0.043***
      [0.016] [0.018] [0.018] [0.009] [0.009] 
Access to Finance      0.042*** 0.024** 0.014 0.010 
       [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] 
Interest Rates       0.029*** 0.006 0.006 
        [0.011] [0.009] [0.008] 
Efficiency of Government Services        -0.139*** -0.117***
         [0.015] [0.018] 
GNI         0.000** 
          [0.000] 
Controls          
Firm Size  0.0004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 
   [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Firm Age  0.020* 0.022** 0.017* 0.013 0.019 0.016 -0.008 -0.010 
   [0.010] [0.011] [0.009] [0.011] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.010] 
State Ownership  -0.524*** -0.448*** -0.404*** -0.416*** -0.448*** -0.446*** -0.240*** -0.213***
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    [0.057] [0.053] [0.046] [0.056] [0.064] [0.065] [0.075] [0.066] 
Industry Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B, First Stage: Dependent Variable is Legal System   
Settler Mortality -0.114*** -0.165*** -0.164*** -0.176*** -0.140*** -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.189*** -0.156***
  [0.014] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.020] [0.023] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic [66.98]*** [88.75]*** [87.65]*** [99.15]*** [63.67]*** [50.38]*** [48.85]*** [91.57]*** [46.06]***
Cragg-Donald F-test [58.40] [77.34] [76.94] [87.27] [54.84] [43.83] [42.52] [80.91] [42.41] 
Number of Observations 18,700 13,169 12,711 12,576 12,385 12,212 12,112 8,605 8,605 
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 Table 5c: GMM Estimates for Ex-Colonies with Population Density in 1500 as Instrument 
 
All the regressions include the constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not reported to save space (available upon request). The first 
stage of all the regressions include the same controls as in the corresponding second stage, but the estimated coefficients of these controls are 
not reported to save space (available upon request). White-robust standard errors are reported in the bracket. *, **, *** represent the statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Panel A, Second Stage: Dependent Variable is Trade Credit   
Legal System 1.195*** 1.224*** 1.441*** 1.134*** 1.017*** 0.955*** 0.904*** 0.880*** 0.702*
  [0.260] [0.183] [0.278] [0.194] [0.157] [0.138] [0.125] [0.232] [0.425]
Business Registration    0.238*** 0.149*** 0.079*** 0.064*** 0.061*** 0.046*** 0.037*
    [0.046] [0.030] [0.018] [0.015] [0.014] [0.018] [0.020]
Labour Regulation    0.094*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.018 0.014 
     [0.016] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.012] [0.010]
Corruption     0.158*** 0.135*** 0.123*** 0.080*** 0.063*
      [0.027] [0.022] [0.020] [0.024] [0.038]
Access to Finance      0.054*** 0.030** 0.030 0.021 
       [0.013] [0.013] [0.019] [0.023]
Interest Rates        0.031** -0.006 0.003 
        [0.012] [0.016] [0.013]
Efficiency of Government Services         -0.224*** -0.182*
         [0.054] [0.104]
GNI          0.000 
           [0.000]
Controls          
Firm Size  -0.018 -0.043** -0.040*** -0.020* -0.012 -0.009 -0.029 -0.016
   [0.012] [0.019] [0.015] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.021] [0.031]
Firm Age  0.017 0.027 0.019 0.016 0.025 0.022 -0.002 -0.008
   [0.020] [0.023] [0.018] [0.017] [0.016] [0.015] [0.018] [0.016]
State Ownership  -0.857*** -0.769*** -0.630*** -0.530*** -0.526*** -0.503*** -0.282** -0.253**
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    [0.129] [0.146] [0.107] [0.087] [0.082] [0.077] [0.120] [0.122]
Industry Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B, First Stage: Dependent Variable is Legal System   
Population Density in 1500 -0.030*** -0.055*** -0.043*** -0.050*** -0.056*** -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.040*** 0.030*
  [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.017]
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic [20.98]*** [43.52]*** [26.12]*** [33.07]*** [40.64]*** [46.70]*** [50.71]*** [14.67]*** [2.97]*
Cragg-Donald F-test [21.07] [43.88] [26.36] [33.33] [41.73] [48.03] [52.43] [14.83] [2.92] 
Number of Observations 19,573 13,984 13,523 13,389 13,198 13,022 12,919 9,233 9,045 
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 Table 5d: GMM Estimates for Ex-Colonies with Urbanisation in 1500 as Instrument 
 
All the regressions include the constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not reported to save space (available upon request). The first 
stage of all the regressions include the same controls as in the corresponding second stage, but the estimated coefficients of these controls are 
not reported to save space (available upon request). White-robust standard errors are reported in the bracket. *, **, *** represent the statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Panel A, Second Stage: Dependent Variable is Trade Credit   
Legal System 0.288*** 0.445*** 0.379*** 0.306*** 0.341*** 0.350*** 0.345*** 0.257*** 0.077*** 
  [0.036] [0.033] [0.027] [0.021] [0.025] [0.027] [0.026] [0.025] [0.017] 
Business Registration    0.070*** 0.036*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
    [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] 
Labour Regulation    0.054*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.019*** 0.011*** 
     [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] 
Corruption     0.052*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.024*** 0.010*** 
      [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] 
Access to Finance      0.021*** 0.009 0.005 -0.003 
       [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005] 
Interest Rates        0.018*** 0.012* 0.007 
        [0.006] [0.007] [0.005] 
Efficiency of Government Services         -0.078*** -0.022***
         [0.008] [0.006] 
GNI          0.000*** 
          [0.000] 
Controls          
Firm Size  0.007 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.007* 0.008* 0.017*** 0.026*** 
   [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] 
Firm Age  0.024*** 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.018** 0.021*** 0.019** -0.018** -0.025***
   [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.006] 
State Ownership  -0.512*** -0.404*** -0.365*** -0.359*** -0.369*** -0.366*** -0.277*** -0.203***
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   [0.045] [0.038] [0.032] [0.035] [0.036] [0.036] [0.061] [0.050] 
Industry Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B, First Stage: Dependent Variable is Legal System   
Urbanisation in 1500 -0.029*** -0.061*** -0.067*** -0.076*** -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.075*** -0.113***
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic [112.06]*** [217.19]*** [250.49]*** [297.81]*** [243.42]*** [234.30]*** [238.07]*** [181.64]*** [233.85]*** 
Cragg-Donald F-test [102.26] [228.75] [268.07] [319.34] [261.08] [251.55] [256.84] [187.07] [252.47] 
Number of Observations 16,951 11,466 11,040 10,948 10,787 10,642 10,557 7,055 7,055 
 Table 6: Alternative Measure of Trade Credit and Legal System for Full Sample 
 
All the regressions include the constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not 
reported to save space (available upon request). White-robust standard errors are 
reported in the bracket. *, **, *** represent the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent Variable Accounts Receivable Ratio Trade Credit Trade Credit 
Legal System 0.008*** 0.005***       
 [0.001] [0.001]       
Legal Service    0.098*** 0.093***    
    [0.009] [0.010]    
Property Rights       0.156*** 0.162***
       [0.004] [0.004] 
Controls          
Firm Size   0.011***   0.008   0.054***
   [0.001]   [0.006]   [0.002] 
Firm Age   0.009***   0.049***   0.014***
   [0.002]   [0.011]   [0.005] 
State Ownership   0.057***   -0.455***   -0.255***
   [0.013]   [0.042]   [0.017] 
Industry Dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of 
Observations 13,725 11,749 7,996 6,845 44,273 37,516 























 Table 7: Firms with Different Borrowing Facilities 
All the regressions include the constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not 
reported to save space (available upon request). White-robust standard errors are 
reported in the bracket. *, **, *** represent the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Sample Firms with Overdraft Facilities Firms without Overdraft Facilities
Legal System 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.010** 0.011** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] 
Controls       
Firm Size   0.009**   0.028*** 
   [0.005]   [0.005] 
Firm Age   0.053***   -0.006 
   [0.008]   [0.009] 
State Ownership   -0.384***   -0.383*** 
   [0.036]   [0.035] 
Industry Dummy No Yes No Yes 
Number of Observations 10,927 9,595 10,439 8,655 
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Table 8: Firms in Countries with Different Development Levels 
All the regressions include the constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not 
reported to save space (available upon request). White-robust standard errors are 
reported in the bracket. *, **, *** represent the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Sample More-developed Countries Less-developed Countries 
Legal System 0.022*** 0.007** 0.014*** 0.005 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] 
Controls       
Firm Size   0.051***   0.020*** 
   [0.003]   [0.004] 
Firm Age   0.062***   0.029*** 
   [0.006]   [0.007] 
State Ownership   -0.371***   -0.248*** 
   [0.024]   [0.024] 
Industry Dummy No Yes No Yes 
Number of
Observations 24,401 20,496 18,795 16,104 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
 Table 9: GMM Estimates with Property Rights as the Dependent Variable 
All the regressions include the constant term, but the estimated coefficients are not reported to save space (available upon request). The first 
stage of all the regressions include the same controls as in the corresponding second stage, but the estimated coefficients of these controls are 
not reported to save space (available upon request). White-robust standard errors are reported in the bracket. *, **, *** represent the statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
  Full Sample Ex-Colonies Only 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Panel A, Second Stage: Dependent Variable is Trade Credit  
Property Rights 0.472*** 0.116*** 0.323*** 0.241*** 0.234*** 0.331*** 0.072*** 0.193*** 
  [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010] [0.006] [0.007] 
Controls          
Firm Size  0.031***   0.042***  0.050***  0.034*** 
   [0.002]   [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Firm Age  0.006   -0.043***  -0.066***  -0.040*** 
   [0.005]   [0.006]  [0.005]  [0.005] 
State Ownership  -0.128***   0.071  0.168***  0.040 
   [0.011]   [0.028]  [0.029]  [0.026] 
Industry Dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Panel B, First Stage: Dependent Variable is Property Rights  
Legal Origin 0.357*** 0.391***        
  [0.008] [0.012]        
Settler Mortality   -0.368*** -0.400***     
    [0.010] [0.013]     
Population Density in 1500      -0.153*** -0.202***   
       [0.003] [0.004]   
Urbanisation in 1500        -0.117*** -0.140*** 
         [0.002] [0.002] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic [1708.55]*** [872.86]*** [2968.15]*** [1581.11]*** [2371.70]*** [2772.71]*** [2467.06]*** [2091.72]*** 
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Cragg-Donald F-test [1337.64] [938.27] [1719.93] [1359.56] [1567.74] [1954.52] [5187.70] [4483.07] 
Number of Observations 44,273 37,516 19,024 13,366 19,936 14,218 17,232 11,629 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
